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Abstract
Although Galton recognized in the 1880s that some individuals lack visual imagery, this phenomenon was mostly neglected
over the following century. We recently coined the terms “aphantasia” and “hyperphantasia” to describe visual imagery
vividness extremes, unlocking a sustained surge of public interest. Aphantasia is associated with subjective impairment of
face recognition and autobiographical memory. Here we report the first systematic, wide-ranging neuropsychological and
brain imaging study of people with aphantasia (n = 24), hyperphantasia (n = 25), and midrange imagery vividness (n = 20).
Despite equivalent performance on standard memory tests, marked group differences were measured in autobiographical
memory and imagination, participants with hyperphantasia outperforming controls who outperformed participants with
aphantasia. Face recognition difficulties and autistic spectrum traits were reported more commonly in aphantasia. The
Revised NEO Personality Inventory highlighted reduced extraversion in the aphantasia group and increased openness in the
hyperphantasia group. Resting state fMRI revealed stronger connectivity between prefrontal cortices and the visual network
among hyperphantasic than aphantasic participants. In an active fMRI paradigm, there was greater anterior parietal
activation among hyperphantasic and control than aphantasic participants when comparing visualization of famous faces
and places with perception. These behavioral and neural signatures of visual imagery vividness extremes validate and
illuminate this significant but neglected dimension of individual difference.
Key words: aphantasia, autobiographical, hyperphantasia, imagery, neuroimaging
Introduction
Vision is our preeminent sense modality, deployed in the here
and now. Most of us can also imagine the appearances of scenes
and objects in their absence, enjoying an experience that is
typically less vivid than “real seeing” but nonetheless has a
distinctively visual feel: We refer to this as the experience of
visual imagery (Pearson 2019). Visual imagery plays a prominent
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autobiographical recollection, future thinking, and nocturnal
dreaming (Schacter and Addis 2007; Smallwood and Schooler
2015); it can influence perception (Pearson 2019), exerts a potent
influence on emotions (Holmes and Mathews 2010), and has
implicated in creativity and mental practice (Shepard 1988;
Munzert and Lorey 2013). Yet the experience of imagery proves
to be highly variable. We have recently described individuals
with a lifelong lack of visual imagery, or “aphantasia,” and others
whose imagery is “as vivid as real seeing” or “hyperphantasia”
(Zeman et al. 2015; Zeman et al. 2020). Here, we report the
first systematic study of the neuropsychological and neural
signatures of aphantasia and hyperphantasia.
The 19th-century psychologist, Francis Galton, devised the
earliest measure of the vividness of visual imagery (Galton 1880).
Using his “breakfast table questionnaire” that invited partici-
pants to rate the “illumination, definition and coloring” of “your
breakfast table as you sat down to it this morning,” Galton
recognized that in some participants “the powers [of visualiza-
tion] are zero” (p. 306). However, this phenomenon, the lifelong
absence of a mind’s eye, has been almost entirely neglected
until our recent descriptions (Zeman et al. 2015; Zeman et al.
2020). The only exception is a study suggesting that 2–3% of
the undergraduate population are “lifelong non-imagers” (Faw
2009).
Previous work focusing on less extreme variations in imagery
vividness indicates that they exert a particularly strong influence
on autobiographical recollection (Palombo et al. 2018): Imagery
vividness correlates positively with the fluency of autobiograph-
ical recall and the density of sensory details in autobiographical
recollection (D’Argembeau and Van der Linden 2006; Vannucci
et al. 2016). More vivid autobiographical memories, in turn, are
associated with stronger activation in visual cortices at the time
of recollection (Gilboa et al. 2004) and stronger resting state
connectivity between the medial temporal and occipital lobes
(Sheldon et al. 2016). Disorders affecting vision itself and visual
imagery have been linked to autobiographical memory impair-
ment (Rubin and Greenberg 1998; Greenberg and Knowlton 2014;
Ahmed et al. 2018).
Beyond the domain of memory, studies focusing on the vivid-
ness of “object imagery” suggest that high—but not extreme—
trait vividness scores are associated with enhanced performance
on certain perceptual tasks, such as identifying degraded figures,
and are overrepresented among artists; high “spatial imagery”
scores, in contrast, are associated with enhanced performance
in visuospatial tasks and are overrepresented among scientists
(Blazhenkova and Kozhevnikov 2010). There is evidence for
an association between lifelong face recognition difficulty—
congenital prosopagnosia—and reduced imagery vividness
(Gruter et al. 2009), and, conversely, an association between
synesthesia and elevated levels of imagery vividness (Barnett
and Newell 2008).
The neural basis of typical visual imagery has been explored
extensively in recent decades, building on extensive preceding
reflection and research on the cognitive nature of imagery (Koss-
lyn et al. 2006; Mackisack et al. 2016). The “visualization net-
work” involves a combination of regions, including frontoparietal
regions subserving executive/attentional control and the control
of eye movements; areas involved in memory, with overlap with
the default mode network; and “visual” regions including the
fusiform and primary visual cortices (Winlove et al. 2018; Pearson
2019). The process of visualization has been conceptualized as
“vision in reverse”: During imagery, the usual flow of information
from the retina through the visual system to multimodal cortices
involved in the control of behavior is reversed, exploiting the
extensive feedback pathways that ordinarily play a more sub-
tle and unobtrusive role in vision (Friston et al. 2012; Pearson
2019; Breedlove et al. 2020). The neural correlates of imagery
vividness, specifically, are controversial: There is evidence for
an inverse relationship between the strength and vividness of
visual imagery and the surface area and excitability of the pri-
mary visual cortex, in contrast to positive relationships with
the surface area of frontal regions (Bergmann et al. 2016; Keogh
et al. 2020). Vividness correlates with the degree of activation
of higher-order visual areas and regions of the limbic system
or default mode network (Fulford et al. 2018). The neural basis
of extreme imagery vividness has not been investigated pre-
viously, with the exception of case studies of patients whose
imagery vividness has been perturbed by neurological or psy-
chiatric disorder (Farah 1984; Bartolomeo 2008; Zeman et al.
2010).
Our description of “aphantasia” in 2015 attracted global
publicity, resulting in email contact from >14 000 individuals,
the majority describing lifelong aphantasia, but many also
reporting its converse, lifelong hyperphantasia (Zeman et al.
2020). Data from a community-based biobank suggest a
prevalence of 0.7% for “extreme aphantasia” and 2.5% for
“extreme hyperphantasia,” defined as floor and ceiling scores
on the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) (Zeman
et al. 2020). A questionnaire-based study among individuals
with extreme imagery who contacted us spontaneously indi-
cates that aphantasia is associated with reported difficulty
in autobiographical memory and face recognition, while
hyperphantasia is associated with an increased frequency of
synesthesia (Zeman et al. 2020). Participants with aphantasia
were significantly more likely to work in scientific or math-
ematical domains, while participants with hyperphantasia
were more often employed in “creative” professions. Visual
aphantasia is variably associated with the absence of imagery
in other modalities, while visual imagery during dreaming is
often preserved, suggesting a dissociation between wakeful
and dreaming imagery. The frequency of aphantasia in first-
degree relatives is elevated, hinting at a possible genetic
contribution to imagery vividness. Although we did not enquire
systematically about the presence of autistic spectrum disorder
in our participants with extreme imagery, many people with
aphantasia mentioned spontaneously that they fall on the
autistic spectrum. Dawes et al. (2020) have recently reported
broadly similar results from an independent questionnaire
survey.
While these findings are suggestive, they rely on first-
person report: Introspection can, of course, be fallible (Zeman
et al. 2020). Differences in visual imagery vividness judgments
could reflect differences in metacognition rather than true
differences in vividness. There is therefore a need to triangulate
these first-person findings with more objective measurements
of both behavioral and neural correlates of visual imagery
extremes. Such evidence has begun to accumulate in recent
reports: People with aphantasia are unable to use imagery
to modulate perception during binocular rivalry (Keogh and
Pearson 2018); exhibit a reduced galvanic skin response to
visually evocative narratives with a strong emotional impact
on control participants (Wicken et al. 2019); show reduced
precision of visual working memory (Jacobs et al. 2018); and
recall fewer objects and colors from studied scenes than
control participants (Bainbridge et al. 2021). These findings
suggest that people reporting aphantasia have introspected a
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We recruited participants with aphantasia, hyperphantasia,
and average imagery vividness to investigate a range of hypothe-
ses based on our questionnaire data. On the behavioral plane,
we predicted that individuals with aphantasia would display
impairments of autobiographical memory, future and atemporal
imagination, and face recognition. On the neural plane, we
predicted that there would be brain imaging signatures of visual
imagery vividness extremes, which we investigated using a
multimodal approach (structural MRI, task-based fMRI, rest-
ing state fMRI [rsfMRI], and diffusion tensor imaging). We
suspected, more tentatively, that there might be differences
in personality or traits relevant to autistic spectrum disorder
between people with aphantasia and hyperphantasia. This
suspicion is supported by some recent evidence (Dance et al.
2021). Finally, our previous work (Zeman et al. 2010) suggested
that tests traditionally thought to be sensitive to differences
in imagery vividness might discriminate poorly between these
groups.
We note that the term “imagination” is ambiguous, as it can
refer, among other things, to the ability to summon up an image
of a specific item (“imagine an apple”) and to the richer ability
to represent some possible or future scene or event (“imagine
the next party you will go to”). We distinguish these two senses
here by using the term “visualization” to refer to the former and
“imagination” to refer to the latter.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Sixty-nine participants completed the study. Twenty-four
participants had aphantasia, defined as having a Vividness
of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (modified VVIQ; Marks 1973)
score between 16–23/80 (Zeman et al. 2020), and twenty-
five had hyperphantasia, defined as a VVIQ score between
75 and 80 (Zeman et al. 2020). Participants with aphantasia
and hyperphantasia were recruited from a variety of sources
(spontaneous email contacts to the research team, the Extend
Biobank, and members of the University community). They
reported that their imagery vividness had been a lifelong trait
(i.e., not acquired). Twenty control participants with VVIQ
scores in the midrange (55–60) were recruited from a local
Biobank (http://exeter.crf.nihr.ac.uk/extend). The mean score
VVIQ among the control participants (56.95) was similar to the
mean score in our previous community-based control group
(58.6). All participants (with aphantasia, hyperphantasia, and
controls) satisfied the requirements that 1) they could attend
in person on two occasions for testing and scanning; 2) they
were otherwise healthy; and 3) they were right-handed. Seven
participants (three with aphantasia, three with hyperphantasia,
and one control) underwent neuropsychological testing but
not MRI scanning for a variety of reasons (obesity, metallic
implants, scanner failure, and logistical reasons) and were
therefore excluded from the study. Ethical approval for this
study was obtained from the University of Exeter Psychology
Ethics Committee. As expected, there was a significant overall
difference in the VVIQ score between groups, F(2,66) = 5245.53,
P < 0.001, η2p = 0.994. Pairwise comparisons indicated that the
VVIQ score for the aphantasia group (M = 16.92, SD = 1.47)
was significantly lower than for both the control (M = 56.95,
SD = 2.93) and hyperphantasia (M = 77.08, SD = 1.75) groups
(both Ps < 0.001), while the VVIQ score for the hyperphantasia




Standard neuropsychological tests were used to investigate
general intelligence (Weschler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence;
Wechsler 2011 or the Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale; Wechsler
2008) and executive functioning (Trails test and letter [FAS] and
animal fluency, e.g., Steinberg et al. 2005). Depression and anxiety
were assessed using the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale
(Zigmond and Snaith 1983). The Autism Spectrum Quotient
questionnaire (Baron-Cohen et al. 2001) and the NEO Five-Factor
Inventory-3 (McCrae and Costa 2010) were also administered.
Anterograde Memory
Anterograde memory was measured using the Logical Memory
Test (immediate and 30 min delayed recall as well as 30 min
delayed recognition of a prose passage) (Wechsler 1997), the
Rey–Osterrieth Complex Figure Test (copy and 30 min delayed
recall) (Osterreith and Rey 1944), and the Warrington Recognition
Memory Test (Warrington 1984) for word and face recognition.
Visual Imagery Tests
We used the Manikins test (Ratcliff 1979) to assess mental rota-
tion. In this test, a manikin holding a black disk in one hand was
either presented facing the participant or with its back to the
participant and was standing either the right way up or upside
down. Participants had to say which hand the black disk was in.
There were 3 practice trials and 32 experimental trials.
In the curved segment test (van der Meulen et al. 2009), each
letter in the alphabet was shown in lower case. Participants were
asked to say whether the upper-case letter (not shown) corre-
sponding to each lower-case letter has a curved line segment to
it (e.g., “A” would not have a curved segment, while “P” would).
In the animal tails test (Behrmann et al. 1994), the names
of 40 animals were presented (e.g., hedgehog and squirrel) and
participants were asked to judge whether the animal had a short
or a long tail relative to its body size. In all three tests, accuracy
was the dependent measure.
Future and Atemporal Imagination
The future and atemporal imagination tasks were closely based
on the procedures previously described by Hassabis et al. (2007).
For the atemporal imagination task, participants were provided
with three scenarios (1) imagine that you are sitting on a white
sandy beach on a beautiful tropical bay; 2) imagine that you are
standing in the main hall of a museum containing many exhibits;
3) imagine that you are standing in the middle of a bustling street
market), read out by the experimenter. Participants were asked
to imagine each scenario and describe it in as much detail as
possible. Participants were told not to recount an actual memory
or any part of one but to create something new. Participants
continued until they came to a natural end. Extra details were
then sought by the experimenter via general probes (e.g., can
you see anything else in the scene?). The experimenter did not
introduce any piece of information that had not already been
described by the participant. After this, the participants rated
their scenarios on a scale of 1 to 5 in terms of their sense of
presence (1, “did not feel like I was there at all”; 5, “felt strongly
like I was really there”) and perceived salience (1, “couldn’t really
see anything”; 5, “extremely salient”).
In the future imagination task, participants were asked to
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event; 2) possible event over next weekend; 3) possible future
meeting with a friend) that were specific in time and place,
and realistic in nature. Participants were told that it should not
be a past event transferred to the future. As in the atemporal
imagination test, participants were asked to imagine the event
and describe it in as much detail as possible. After the partici-
pants had finished their description, the experimenter provided
general prompts to extract further information. At the end of the
scenario, participants were again asked to rate on a scale from 1
to 5 their sense of presence and perceived salience.
Scoring for both tasks was conducted in the manner
described by Hassabis et al. (Hassabis et al. 2007) with the
exception that we did not include the spatial coherence index
measure. The reason for this is that this self-report index asks
participants specifically to describe the nature of the visual
imagery they are experiencing (e.g., “It was a collection of
separate images.”), which would be difficult for the aphantasia
group to rate in the same way as the other groups. This resulted
in a composite score out of 54 comprising three components.
For the first component—Content—the scorer (K.K.), who was
blind to the groups to which participants belonged, classified
statements by the participant as belonging to one of the following
four categories: spatial reference, entity presence, sensory
description, or thought/emotion/action. Repetitions or irrelevant
information was not scored. Following the original protocol
(Hassabis et al. 2007), the score for the number of unique details
in a category was capped at 7, making a total content score of
28. The second component was the Participant ratings detailed
above (although the ratings were rescaled from 1–5 to 0–4, the
overall measure was scored out of 8). The final component
was the scorer’s own assessment of the extent to which the
description evoked a detailed picture of the experience in their
own mind’s eye (0, no picture at all; 10, vivid, extremely rich
picture). Following the original protocol (Hassabis et al. 2007), this
score was multiplied by 1.8 to give a measure scored out of 18. We
averaged the composite score of the three scenarios for both the
atemporal and future imagination tasks (One control participant
was excluded from the future imagination task due to technical
problems with the audio recording. For similar reasons, the
average future imagination score for one of the hyperphantasia
participants was based on two rather than three scenarios.). A
second scorer (C.D.) analyzed a subset of the descriptions (32%)
independently. Coefficients showed that the agreement between
the scorers was high for both the atemporal (0.99) and future
imagination (0.97) tasks.
Autobiographical Memory
The Autobiographical Interview (Levine et al. 2002) involved three
phases: A recall stage where participants were asked to recollect
as much information as they could about a unique, temporally
restricted, event that they were personally involved in for both
an event in the most recent 5 years (but not in the previous
3 months) and an event that was more than 5 years old (the
remote time period); a general probe consisting of nonspecific
questions (e.g., “can you provide more details?”); and a specific
probe where participants underwent a semistructured interview
in order to extract as much contextual detail as possible. The
specific probe was administered after completing the free recall
and general probe phases for each memory.
The memories were audiorecorded, transcribed, and scored
using standard procedures (Levine et al. 2002). Specifically, nar-
ratives were segmented into details classified as “internal” or
“external.” Internal details were episodic information specific to
the selected event that can be subdivided into event, percep-
tual, time, place, and emotion/thought details. External details
included information extrinsic to the event and consisted of
semantic (factual information or extended events) and “other”
(e.g., metacognitive statements, editorializing, and inferences)
details. Contextual information that was not part of the chosen
episode was also classified as external detail. Repetitions were
scored but not included as either internal or external details
(c.f., Milton et al. 2010). Additionally, qualitative ratings were
assigned to each memory (Levine et al. 2002). The time, place,
perceptual, and emotion/thought subcategories were rated on
a scale from 0 (no information relating to that subcategory) to
3 (specific, rich detail pertaining to the subcategory). Episodic
richness was scored on a 0–6 scale to account for its greater
importance. A time integration measure (on a 0–3 scale) assessed
the integration of the episode into a larger time scale. The ratings
summed to 21. The interviews were all analyzed by one scorer
(F.M.), for consistency, who was blind to the groups to which
participants belonged. A second scorer (C.D.) analyzed a subset of
the memories (32%) independently. Coefficients showed that the
agreement between the scorers was high for the internal details
(0.89), external details (0.92), and the qualitative ratings (0.95).
Face and Buildings Recognition
Participants completed the 20-item Prosopagnosia Index (PI20)
questionnaire (Shah et al. 2015) to test for perceived face recog-
nition difficulties. In addition, we developed a 15-item famous
faces test, in which participants were presented with four similar
faces and they had to pick out which was the famous face (e.g.,
Barack Obama and George Clooney). In the graded buildings
test (Evans et al. 1995), participants were required to identify 30
buildings varying from easy (e.g., the Leaning Tower of Pisa) to
hard (e.g., Sagrada Familia). Each building was scored out of 2
(1 mark for correct names, 1 for correct location).
Neuropsychological tests were administered in the same
order to all participants during a single testing session, lasting
approximately 3 h. If participants became fatigued during
testing, they were encouraged to take a break, but this was
seldom required. Questionnaires were completed prior to the
scanning session. For logistical reasons, neuroimaging and
neuropsychological testing were performed on the same day
in 30 participants, on different days in 39 participants.
Correction for Multiple Comparisons
As there is no consensus on the appropriate correction for mul-
tiple comparisons in neuropsychological studies, we have given
uncorrected probabilities but also indicate whether these survive
a strict Bonferroni correction on the basis that we have per-
formed 34 tests (0.05/34 = 0.0015). To avoid repetition, we indicate
the findings that remain significant at the corrected threshold
with a bold asterisk∗.
Neuroimaging Methods
Scanning was performed using a 1.5 T system (Intera, Philips,
the Netherlands) at the Exeter University Magnetic Resonance
Research Centre (Exeter, UK). fMRI was undertaken using a
T2∗-weighted single-shot echoplanar (EPI) scanning sequence
(Repetition time [TR] = 3 s, Echo time [TE] = 50 ms, resolution
2.88 × 2.88 × 3.6 mm, 38 slices, 90◦ flip angle) and comprised two
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of 17.5 min per run. Resting state data were acquired using a T2∗-
weighted single-shot EPI scanning sequence (TR = 3 s, TE = 50 ms,
resolution 2.5 × 2.5 × 3.5 mm, 37 slices, 90◦ flip angle) with 160
repetitions and a total acquisition time of 8 min. Diffusion
tensor imaging (DTI) (TR = 9470 ms, TE = 66 ms, resolution
2.3 × 2.3 × 3 mm, 48 slices) was undertaken with 32 diffusion
directions with b values of 0 and 1000 s mm−2. High-resolution
T1-weighted anatomical images, which covered the whole head
and were centered approximately over the anterior commissure,
were acquired with a resolution of 0.9 × 0.9 × 0.9 mm. The order
of acquisition was as follows: survey scans, fMRI, resting state,
structural, DTI.
Resting State fMRI
During the resting state protocol, participants were instructed
to stay awake, keep their eyes open, and look at the projec-
tion screen on which was displayed a cross. They were further
instructed to look in the general direction of the cross but not to
fixate on it in a concentrated fashion. Resting state analysis was
undertaken in the CONN software package (www.nitrc.org/proje
cts/conn, RRID:SCR_009550). Initially, preprocessing was carried
out on the raw data, consisting of realignment, normalization,
outlier detection (ART-based scrubbing. Using the 95th percentile
in normative data, a global signal z-value threshold of 3, and
participant motion threshold of 0.5 mm), and smoothing (8 mm).
Regions of interest (ROI) were then specified based on the FSL
Harvard-Oxford atlas (Desikan et al. 2006) covering cortical and
subcortical areas, the automated anatomical labeling atlas (AAL)
(Tzourio-Mazoyer et al. 2002) for cerebellar regions, and the
CONN list of commonly used networks (Whitfield-Gabrieli and
Nieto-Castanon 2012). Denoising was subsequently undertaken
to remove motion associated with physiological and artefactual
effects via the use of linear regression (using global white mat-
ter signal, CSF signal, realignment parameters, and scrubbing
parameters as confounds) and band-pass filtering. Based on
previous findings (Winlove et al. 2018; Pearson 2019), analysis
was then undertaken at a seed-to-voxel level using the fol-
lowing regions/networks as the initial seed: Frontoparietal lat-
eral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) network, dorsal attention network,
visual–occipital network, and the hippocampus. Significance was
defined as occurring with an uncorrected P < 0.001 for the height
threshold and P < 0.05 for the FDR corrected cluster size.
Task-Based fMRI
Prior to the scanning protocol, participants were shown a series
of color images corresponding to famous places and faces and
asked to identify them. From this larger set, a subset of 40 famous
faces with neutral expressions presented from the front and
40 famous places, which the participants were familiar with
and had correctly identified, were used for the subsequent fMRI
protocol.
During each of two runs of the fMRI protocol, participants
undertook a modified version of the task performed by MX
(Zeman et al. 2010), which consisted of three different tasks,
grouped into blocks and separated by a blank white screen dis-
played for between 0.5 and 2.5 s, with the exact length random-
ized from set to set. The task was undertaken within a darkened
scanner room where the only illumination was provided via the
projection of the task images that filled the full visual field of
the participants in the direction they were facing. In the first
“Perception” block, a famous place or face image was presented
for 6 s, followed by a response screen for 2 s where participants
were instructed to rate the pleasantness of the image they saw
on a 1–3 scale (from least to most pleasant) via a three-button
response pad, activated by their right (dominant) hand, having
previously ensured all text was clearly readable by the participant
within the scanner. Subsequently, a blank screen was shown
for a randomized length between 0.5 and 2.5 s. Four sequential
image/response/blank screen sets were presented per block. The
following “Control” block (Stark and Squire 2001) consisted of a
single-digit number shown for 2 s followed by a feedback screen
for 2 s where participants were instructed to indicate whether
the number was odd or even via the first two buttons of the
three-button response pad. A blank screen was then shown for
a randomized length between 0.5 and 2.5 s. Four trials were
presented per block. In the final “Imagery” block, participants
were shown a screen for 6 s instructing them to imagine a named
person or place, corresponding to one of the images they had
seen earlier in the protocol (the specific instruction was to “think
about” the person or place). This was then followed by a feedback
screen for 2 s where participants were instructed to rate the
vividness of the visualization experience on a 1–3 scale (least
to most vivid) via the three-button response pad, after which
a blank screen was shown for a randomized length between
0.5 and 2.5 s. Four sequential image/feedback/blank screen sets
were presented per block. The sequence of Perception–Control–
Imagery blocks outlined above was repeated 10 times per imag-
ing run, resulting in 40 cases of each stimuli type per run.
Feedback responses generated within the task in terms
of visualization vividness and pleasantness of images were
analyzed by one-way ANOVAs to examine differences between
groups and by paired t-tests to assess differences within groups
between the “face” and “place” tasks. All subsequent data anal-
ysis was undertaken using SPM12 software (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.u
k/spm). The data from the two separate fMRI runs were treated
as separate sessions within the analysis, which consisted of
images being slice time corrected, realigned, coregistered to the
T1 structural images, normalized to the Montreal Neurological
Institute template (MNI305), and smoothed using a Gaussian
kernel of 8 mm full-width half-maximum. Following estimation
using a general linear model, employing a hemodynamic
response function, together with temporal and dispersion
derivatives to model the blood oxygen level–dependent response
and including six head movement parameters as regressors,
statistical analysis was carried out to compare activation
patterns associated with the Perception, Control, and Imagery
conditions for each individual. Whole brain comparisons were
then undertaken at a groupwise level with a combined statistical
threshold of P < 0.001 and a threshold of 28 contiguous voxels
(voxel size: 3 × 3 × 3 mm), which together produce an overall
corrected threshold of P < 0.05. These values were estimated
using AlphaSim as implemented in the REST toolbox (Version
1.8, Song et al. 2011). A smoothing estimate of 9.3, 9.1, 9.2 mm
was used (this was a group-level estimate calculated in SPM12
using the group residuals from the general linear model, e.g.,
Kiebel et al. 1999).
Volumetric MRI
Differences between groups in sizes of brain substructures were
assessed by undertaking voxel-based morphometry using the
Dartel toolbox (Ashburner 2007) within SPM12 (the Wellcome
Department of Cognitive Neurology, University College London).
Data was segmented from individuals to generate gray and white
matter images. Non-linear deformations of these images were
established to ensure that these matched across all participants.
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was then undertaken via the use of a linear general model
to examine systematic differences between the groups taking
into account differences in total brain size between individuals.
Significant changes were accepted at a P < 0.05 following family-
wise error correction.
Diffusion Tensor Imaging
Voxelwise statistical analysis of the fractional anisotropy (FA)
data was carried out using tract-based spatial statistics (TBSS,
Smith et al. 2006), part of FSL (Smith et al. 2004). First, FA images
were created by fitting a tensor model to the raw diffusion data
using FDT, within the FSL toolbox, and then brain-extracted using
BET (Smith 2002). All subjects’ FA data were then aligned into
a common space using the nonlinear registration tool FNIRT
(Andersson et al. 2007a, 2007b), which uses a b-spline repre-
sentation of the registration warp field (Rueckert et al. 1999).
A mean FA image was then created and thinned to create a
mean FA skeleton that represents the centers of all tracts com-
mon to the group. Each subject’s aligned FA data were then
projected onto this skeleton and the resulting data fed into vox-
elwise cross-subject statistics. Statistics were undertaken using
the “Randomize” tool within FSL, employing the threshold-free
cluster enhancement (TFCE) method, which generates cluster-
based thresholding corrected for multiple comparisons, with
significant changes accepted at a P < 0.05.
Data-Sharing
Requests for data-sharing should be addressed to the authors
and will be considered individually. We are keen to share data
where possible, respecting the nature of the consent provided by
our participants.
Results
Demographic and Behavioral Measures
The demographic, neuropsychological, and personality profiles
of the aphantasia, control, and hyperphantasia groups are
displayed in Table 1. There was no significant difference in age
between the groups, F(2,66) = 0.12, P = 0.884, η2p = 0.004. There
was also no difference in gender distribution across groups,
χ2 (2,69) = 3.98, P = 0.136. However, IQ did differ significantly
across the groups, F(2,66) = 5.18, P = 0.008, η2p = 0.136. Pairwise
comparisons indicated that the aphantasia group had a
significantly elevated IQ compared with the hyperphantasia
group (P = 0.002), but there were no other statistically significant
differences.
There was no difference between groups in either Trails
A, F(2,66) = 0.70, P = 0.499, η2p = 0.02, or Trails B, F(2,66) = 1.95,
P = 0.151, η2p = 0.06. There were also no differences between
groups for letter (FAS), F(2,66) = 0.73, P = 0.486, η2p = 0.02, and
Animals, F(2,66) = 1.07, P = 0.347, η2p = 0.03, verbal fluency.
On the HADS anxiety measure, there was no overall difference
between groups, F(2,66) = 0.01, P = 0.992, η2p < 0.001. For depres-
sion, there was also no overall difference, F(2,66) = 2.69, P = 0.076,
η2p = 0.08.
For the Autism Quotient measure, there was a significant
overall difference between groups, F(2,66) = 4.64, P = 0.013,
η2p = 0.12. Pairwise comparisons revealed that the aphantasia
group had a significantly higher score than the controls
(P = 0.003). There was no statistical difference in scores between
the hyperphantasia and control groups (P = 0.151).
Turning to the revised NEO Personality Inventory, there
was no overall difference between groups for Neuroticism,
F(2,66) = 0.27, P = 0.764, η2p < 0.01, or Agreeableness, F(2,66) = 0.32,
P = 0.731, η2p < 0.01 (in both cases, all pairwise comparisons,
P > 0.4). However, there was a significant overall difference in
terms of Extraversion, F(2,66) = 5.93, P = 0.004, η2p = 0.15. Pairwise
comparisons revealed that the aphantasia group scored signif-
icantly lower on this measure than both the control (P = 0.004)
and hyperphantasia (P = 0.004) groups. There was no difference
in Extraversion between the control and hyperphantasia groups
(P = 0.876). There were also differences between groups on
the Openness to Experience measure, F(2,66) = 6.92, P = 0.002,
η2p = 0.17, with the hyperphantasia group scoring significantly
higher on this measure than both the aphantasia (P < 0.001) and
control (P = 0.021) groups. There was no difference between the
aphantasia and control groups (P = 0.273).
Anterograde Memory
The mean scores across groups for all the anterograde memory
tests are shown in Table 2. There were no significant differ-
ences between groups for either the copy, F(2,66) = 0.82, P = 0.443,
η2p = 0.02, or delayed recall, F(2,66) = 0.12, P = 0.294, η2p = 0.04, of the
Rey–Osterrieth Complex Figure Test.
For the immediate recall of the logical memory test, there
was no statistically significant difference between groups,
F(2,66) = 3.03, P = 0.055, η2p = 0.08. There were no overall differ-
ences between groups for either the 30 min delayed recall,
F(2,66) = 1.61, P = 0.209, η2p = 0.05, or recognition, F(2,66) = 1.42,
P = 0.249, η2p = 0.04, tests. There were also no statistical differ-
ences between groups for the Warrington Recognition Words,
F(2,66) = 0.01, P = 0.987, η2p < 0.001, and Faces, F(2,66) = 1.12,
P = 0.332, η2p = 0.03, tests.
Visual Imagery Tests
The mean scores across groups for each of the visual imagery
tests are displayed in Table 3. There was no overall difference
between groups for the Manikins test, F(2,66) = 1.85, P = 0.165,
η2p = 0.05, or for the curved segments test, F(2,66) = 0.24, P = 0.789,
η2p = 0.01. For the animal tails test, the overall difference between
conditions narrowly missed conventional statistical significance,
F(2,66) = 3.07, P = 0.053, η2p = 0.09.
Future and Atemporal Imagination
The mean scores across conditions for the atemporal and
future imagination tasks are displayed in Figure 1. For the
atemporal imagination task, there was a significant overall
difference between groups, F(2,66) = 86.88, P < 0.001∗, η2p = 0.73,
with the aphantasia group scoring significantly lower than
the control and hyperphantasia groups (both Ps < 0.001), while
the hyperphantasia group scored significantly higher than the
control group (P = 0.001).
There was also a significant overall difference between
groups for the future imagination task, F(2,65) = 41.21, P < 0.001∗,
η2p = 0.56, with pairwise comparisons revealing that the aphan-
tasia group had a significantly lower composite score than
the control and hyperphantasia groups (both Ps < 0.001).
Furthermore, the hyperphantasia group had a significantly
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Table 1. Demographic, neuropsychological, and personality profile of the aphantasia, control, and hyperphantasia groups
Aphantasia mean (SD) Control mean (SD) Hyperphantasia mean (SD)
Gender 14 male/10 female 11 male/9 female 8 male/17 female
Age, years 33.71 (11.25) 34.6 (12.78) 35.36 (11.10)
IQ 115.46 (12.54) 110.00 (11.41) 106.32 (4.51)
Trail A (s) 22.84 (9.01) 21.62 (5.79) 20.42 (6.01)
Trail B (s) 40.18 (9.45) 40.74 (9.65) 46.67 (16.74)
Letter fluency (words/min) 15.65 (4.80) 17.22 (3.35) 16.60 (4.60)
Animal fluency (words/min) 26.67 (5.70) 28.20 (5.59) 25.76 (5.43)
Autism quotient score (/50) 22.04 (7.99) 14.20 (6.24) 17.92 (10.40)
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale scores (max score)
Anxiety (/21) 7.00 (4.67) 7.10 (2.83) 7.16 (5.01)
Depression (/21) 4.21 (2.98) 3.55 (3.10) 2.28 (2.82)
Revised NEO PI (/25–75)
Neuroticism 48.96 (14.94) 51.45 (10.30) 48.96 (12.30)
Agreeableness 53.58 (12.03) 54.65 (11.45) 52.00 (10.47)
Extraversion 46.54 (11.62) 57.75 (11.80) 57.16 (13.82)
Openness to experience 53.21 (12.37) 57.05 (10.40) 65.16 (11.39)
Conscientiousness 42.13 (10.17) 49.5 (9.65) 47.96 (11.67)
Table 2. Performance on the anterograde memory tests across groups
Anterograde memory scores (max score) Aphantasia mean (SD) Control mean (SD) Hyperphantasia mean (SD)
Logical memory test
Immediate recall (25) 11.08 (3.44) 13.45 (4.70) 13.80 (4.29)
Recall delay (25) 10.58 (3.60) 12.55 (4.86) 12.16 (3.37)
Recognition delay (15) 12.21 (1.74) 12.45 (2.01) 13.00 (1.29)
Rey–Osterrieth Complex Figure
Copy (36) 35.33 (1.09) 35.70 (.92) 35.64 (1.08)
Delayed recall (36) 23.17 (5.28) 24.95 (3.99) 25.08 (4.51)
Warrington Recognition Test
Words (50) 49.04 (1.40) 49.10 (1.17) 49.08 (1.08)
Faces (50) 42.79 (4.46) 43.35 (4.85) 44.48 (2.58)
Table 3. Performance on the visual imagery tests across groups
Visual imagery test (max score) Aphantasia mean (SD) Control mean (SD) Hyperphantasia mean (SD)
Manikins test (32) 30.42 (3.16) 29.75 (2.47) 31.20 (1.78)
Curved segments test (26) 25.63 (0.92) 25.65 (0.67) 25.76 (0.52)
Animal tails test (40) 32.92 (3.65) 34.05 (2.74) 35.00 (2.27)
Whilst there was no clear departure from normality for any
of the conditions, as a safety check we run the same analyses
using the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test with follow-up
pairwise comparisons conducted using Mann-Whitney U tests.
These analyses led to exactly the same conclusions as the results
reported above.
Autobiographical Memory
Mean scores for the internal and external details together with
the qualitative ratings are shown in Figure 2. The mean number
of internal details for the recent time period was analyzed using
a one-way ANOVA and revealed a significant difference across
groups, F(2,66) = 13.67, P < 0.001∗, η2p = 0.293. Pairwise compar-
isons revealed that the aphantasia group produced significantly
fewer internal details than both the control and hyperphan-
tasia groups (both Ps < 0.01). In addition, the hyperphantasia
group generated significantly more internal details than the
control group (P = 0.041). There was also a significant effect for the
remote time period, F(2,66) = 27.74, P < 0.001∗, η2p = 0.457. Pairwise
comparisons again showed that the aphantasia group recalled
significantly fewer internal details than both the control and
hyperphantasia groups (both Ps < 0.001), while the hyperphanta-
sia group produced more internal details than the control group
(P < 0.004).
Analysis of the qualitative rating for the recent time period
also yielded a significant overall difference between groups,
F(2,66) = 7.19, P < 0.002, η2p = 0.30, with the aphantasia group
having a significantly lower mean score than both the control
(P = 0.018) and hyperphantasia (P < 0.001) groups. There was no
statistical difference between the control and hyperphantasia
groups (P = 0.273) although the hyperphantasia group had a
numerically higher average. A similar pattern emerged for
the remote time period—there was a significant overall effect,
F(2,66) = 13.62, P < 0.001∗, η2p = 0.292 with the aphantasia group
having a lower score than the control (P = 0.002) and hyper-
phantasia groups (P < 0.001). There was no significant difference
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Figure 1. Mean composite score (maximum = 54) for each group in the atemporal and future imagination tasks. The thick line within the violin plots display the median
score, the thinner lines reflect the 25th and 75th percentiles. The top and bottom of the violin plots illustrate the lowest and highest scores in the sample. The plots
were created using Prism GraphPad Prism v. 9 (https://www.graphpad.com/scientific-software/prism/).
For external details, there was a significant overall difference
between groups for the recent time period, F(2,66) = 3.51, P = 0.035,
η2p = 0.096, with the hyperphantasia group producing signifi-
cantly more details than the control group (P = 0.002). The other
comparisons were not statistically different (Ps > 0.05). There was
also a significant difference between groups for the remote time
period, F(2,66) = 6.02, P = 0.004, η2p = 0.154. The hyperphantasia
group recalled more external details than both the aphantasia
(P = 0.044) and control (P = 0.001) groups. There was no statistical
difference between the aphantasia and control group (P = 0.147).
For the autobiographical memory data, the data for some
of the groups was of questionable normality. We again ran
additional analyses using the Kruskal-Wallis test, using Mann-
Whitney U tests for follow-up pairwise comparisons as a safety
check. These analyses produced the identical pattern of results
as presented above, with the exception that for the external
details recent time period, the pairwise comparison revealed
that the aphantasia group had a higher mean score than the
control group (P = .040).
Finally, we calculated the ratio of internal:total details (c.f.,
Levine et al. 2002). These ratios for both remote and recent
memories can be seen in Table 4. For the recent period, there was
a significant overall difference between groups, F(2,69) = 18.97,
P < 0.001∗, η2p = 0.365. Pairwise comparisons revealed that the
aphantasia group had a significantly lower ratio than both the
control and hyperphantasia groups (both Ps < 0.001). There was
no statistical difference between the hyperphantasia and control
groups (P = 0.154). For the remote time period, there was also
a significant overall difference between groups, F(2,66) = 23.50,
P < 0.001∗, η2p = 0.416. The aphantasia group again had a signif-
icantly lower ratio than the control and hyperphantasia groups
(P < 0.001), but there was no statistically significant difference
between the control and hyperphantasia groups (P = 0.095).
Face and Buildings Recognition
The mean scores for Prosopagnosia Index (PI) (Shah et al. 2015),
the famous faces recognition test, and the graded buildings
test are presented in Table 4. There was a significant overall
difference between groups for the PI, F(2,66) = 12.83, P < 0.001∗,
η2p = 0.28, with the aphantasia group reporting their face recogni-
tion ability as significantly worse than both the control (P = 0.001)
and hyperphantasia groups (P < 0.001). There was no difference
in mean score between the control and hyperphantasia groups
(P = 0.21).
In contrast to the results for the PI, there was no overall
statistical difference between groups for the 15-item famous
faces recognition test, F(2,66) = 0.67, P = 0.516, η2p = 0.02. The
famous buildings test, though, did yield a significant overall
difference between groups, F(2,66) = 3.43, P = 0.038, η2p = 0.09, with
the aphantasia group performing significantly worse than the
hyperphantasia group (P = 0.013). There were no other statistical
differences (Ps > 0.5).
Brain Imaging Results
Resting State fMRI
rsfMRI revealed stronger connectivity between the visual–
occipital network and several prefrontal regions (BAs 9, 10,
11) in the hyperphantasic group when compared with the
aphantasic group (see Table 5 and Fig. 3). The left hippocampus
was more strongly connected to the brain stem in the hyper-
phantasic group than the aphantasic group. Stronger resting
state connectivity was detected in the aphantasic group than
in the hyperphantasic group between the left hippocampus
and a region of the anterior cingulate (left BA24); the left
dorsal attention network and the middle frontal gyrus; the
left frontoparietal control network and the left orbitofrontal
cortex (left BA11). Stronger connectivity was also found for
the aphantasic group than the control group between the left
hippocampus and left BA10; the left dorsal attention network
and the right BA8. No significant increase in connectivity
was determined for the control group relative to either the
aphantasic or hyperphantasic groups or for the hyperphantasic
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Figure 2. Violin plots showing: (a) Mean number of internal details recalled for each time period; (b) mean rating (out of 21) for each time period; (c) mean number of
external details recalled for each time period. The thick line within the violin plots displays the median score; the thinner lines reflect the 25th and 75th percentiles.
The top and bottom of the violin plots illustrate the lowest and highest scores in the sample. The plots were created using Prism GraphPad Prism v. 9 (https://www.gra
phpad.com/scientific-software/prism/).
Table 4. Internal to total ratios for the recent and remote time periods
Recent Remote
M SD M SD
Aphantasia 0.56 0.12 0.48 0.13
Hyperphantasia 0.70 0.10 0.64 0.11
Control 0.74 0.08 0.69 0.074
Table 5. Mean scores on the prosopagnosia index questionnaire and the famous face recognition and graded buildings tests across groups
Aphantasia mean (SD) Control mean (SD) Hyperphantasia mean (SD)
Prosopagnosia Index (100) 55.71 (13.23) 43.30 (14.24) 38.72 (8.480)
Famous face recognition (15) 14.21 (1.22) 14.40 (1.00) 14.56 (9.96)
Graded buildings (60) 44.54 (7.37) 46.00 (7.46) 49.72 (6.59)
Task-Based fMRI
In terms of participant feedback recorded during the fMRI task,
there were significant differences (P < 0.001) between the groups
in the vividness of the visualization experience (Mean ± SD:
Aphantasic 1.08 ± 0.25, Control 2.39 ± 0.31, Hyperphantasic
2.81 ± 0.23). However, none of the groups reported a significant
difference between the face and place tasks in terms of
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Table 6. Resting state connectivity differences between aphantasic and hyperphantasic groups
Network Comparison MNI coordinates of center of cluster Anatomical region
Visual–occipital Hyper > Aphan −28, +56, +2 Left BA10
+2, −92, −24 Cerebellum
+40, +32, +38 Right BA9
−24, +32, +36 Left BA9
+8, +46, −12 Right BA11
Hippocampus-left Hyper > Aphan −2, −24, −54 Brain stem
Frontal parietal-left Aphan > Hyper −2, +56, −24 Left BA11
Left dorsal attention IPS (intraparietal sulcus) Aphan > Hyper −32, +22, +38 Middle frontal gyrus
Hippocampus-left Aphan > Hyper −10, −2, +40 Left BA24
Left dorsal attention IPS Aphan > Control +6, +36, +56 Right BA8
Hippocampus-left Aphan > Control −42, +40, +22 Left BA10
Note: The table identifies networks more strongly connected in the hyperphantasic or aphantasic group and the targets of differential connectivity
Figure 3. Seed to voxel connectivity analysis using the visual–occipital network
as initial seed displaying areas of greater connectivity for hyperphantasic than
aphantasic participants.
difference (P > 0.05) between groups for reported pleasantness
of presented images. However, there was a significantly higher
pleasantness rating for “places” compared with “faces” (P < 0.001)
for all three groups.
In terms of brain activation, there were no significant group
differences when comparing perception and visualization with
the control condition (see Supplementary Figs 1–5a,b). However,
hyperphantasic participants activated a left anterior parietal
region in the precentral gyrus (BAs 3 and 4), extending into BA
40, to a greater degree than aphantasic participants, in a subtrac-
tion of perception from visualization (see Table 6 and Fig. 4). A
smaller, symmetrically placed area was more strongly activated
in the right hemisphere. Two regions of the cerebellum, within
the posterior and anterior lobes, and an area of the thalamus,
were also more strongly activated in this comparison in the
hyperphantasic group. In a similar comparison between aphan-
tasic and control participants, the same left anterior parietal
region was more strongly activated in the control sample. No dif-
ference was identified between the control and hyperphantasic
groups in this comparison (Table 7).
Figure 4. Areas more strongly activated in the hyperphantasic and control groups
than the aphantasic group (left and right columns, respectively) in a subtraction
of the perception from the visualization conditions.
Volumetric MRI
No significant differences in brain region volumes were found
between the three groups.
Diffusion Tensor Imaging
No significant differences in fractional anisotropy were detected
between groups for any brain regions.
Discussion
Our study is the first wide-ranging exploration of the neuropsy-
chological and neural associations of aphantasia and hyperphan-
tasia. In keeping with their subjective reports (Dawes et al. 2020;
Zeman et al. 2020), participants from these groups are distin-
guished by their scores on measures of autobiographical mem-
ory, future and atemporal imagination, and face recognition,
but not by standard measures of anterograde memory. rsfMRI
reveals stronger connectivity between the posterior visual net-
work and prefrontal regions among people with hyperphantasia
than those with aphantasia. In a comparison of visualization to
perception, we found higher levels of brain activation centered
on the anterior parietal lobe among people with hyperphantasia
and control participants than in those with aphantasia. Aphan-
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Table 7. Task-based fMRI: areas more strongly activated in hyperphantasic and control than aphantasic participants in a comparison of
visualization with perception
Group comparison Task comparison Cluster center
coordinates
(MNI space)
Cluster center region Cluster size
(number of voxels)
Z Scores
Hyperphantasia > Aphantasia Imagination-
perception
−45 −22 62 Left anterior parietal 411 5.25
−9 −7 5 Thalamus 56 4.45
18 –61 −55 Cerebellum (anterior) 56 4.43
33 –28 35 Right anterior parietal 45 4.22
21 −52 −25 Cerebellum (posterior) 34 4.83
Control > Aphantasia Imagination-
perception
−39 −31 50 Left anterior parietal 225 5.52
hyperphantasia with “openness.” Classic “visual imagery tasks”
discriminate poorly between people with aphantasia and hyper-
phantasia. We discuss each of these findings in turn.
We predicted that aphantasia would be associated with
relatively impoverished autobiographical memory, while hyper-
phantasia would be associated with enriched autobiographical
memory, on the basis of our previous questionnaire data (Zeman
et al. 2020). Despite a modest but statistically significant group
difference in IQ in favor of the aphantasic group and essentially
equivalent performance in the two groups on standard measures
of anterograde recall and recognition memory for visual and
verbal material, this prediction was strongly confirmed. Given
the evidence that autobiographical memory performance is
related to performance on measures of atemporal and future-
directed imagination, and anecdotal evidence from some of our
participants of difficulty with future thinking, we predicted that
there would be similar differences in this domain. This prediction
was also confirmed.
Autobiographical recollection, like the imagination tasks
used in this study, requires participants to project themselves
into mentally constructed scenes, engaging abilities that have
been variously described in terms of “autonoesis” (Tulving 1985),
scene-construction (Hassabis and Maguire 2007), self-projection
(Buckner and Carroll 2007), and constructive episodic simulation
(Schacter and Addis 2020). Such tasks make different demands
to laboratory measures of recall and recognition for recently
encountered material, helping to explain the dissociation evident
here between performance on these two forms of memory test
(Gilboa 2004; Palombo et al. 2018). The markedly contrasting
performance seen in these tasks among participants at the
extremes of the visual imagery vividness spectrum is in keeping
with the more modest correlations between imagery vividness
and the richness of autobiographical memory revealed in
samples with typical imagery vividness (Vannucci et al. 2016;
Palombo et al. 2018).
Why should extreme variations in imagery vividness be asso-
ciated with such marked variations in autobiographical recol-
lection and imagination? Both recollection and imagination typ-
ically involve evocation of sensory details—a “reexperiencing,”
constrained by a past episode in the case of autobiographical
memory, more autonomous in the cause of imagination (Palombo
et al. 2018; Schacter and Addis 2020). The absence of the abil-
ity to evoke sensory details in this way, whether in the visual
modality alone or across all sensory modalities (Dawes et al. 2020;
Zeman et al. 2020), might be expected to have a profound impact
on these cognitive processes. Clinical reports linking cortical
visual impairment to autobiographical memory deficits (Rubin
and Greenberg 1998; Gardini et al. 2011; Ahmed et al. 2018),
taken together with evidence for visual memory impairment in
the recently described Syndrome of Severely Deficient Autobi-
ographical Memory (Palombo et al. 2015), are broadly consistent
with our results. We consider the neural basis for this key finding
below.
We predicted that we would find evidence of face recog-
nition difficulty among participants with aphantasia, but not
hyperphantasia, on the basis of subjective reports (Zeman et al.
2020). The significant elevation of PI scores among aphantasic
participants supports this prediction. Although it is in keeping
with an independent observation of an association between
prosopagnosia and low imagery vividness scores (Gruter et al.
2009), we regard this finding as tentative. The PI is a self-report
measure, albeit a validated one, and it could be that weak facial
imagery has a metacognitive effect, reducing the confidence of
people with aphantasia in their ability to recognize faces. Our
measure of famous face recognition showed a ceiling effect and
was therefore not an adequate objective measure. The contrast
between the performance of the aphantasic and hyperphantasic
groups on the Famous Building Test could reflect a perceptual or
semantic effect and, like face recognition ability itself, requires
further exploration.
Given that people with lifelong aphantasia do not describe
major perceptual difficulties yet are unable to summon images
to the mind’s eye voluntarily, reduction in connectivity between
relevant cognitive control systems and visual cortices offers a
plausible neural mechanism. The underlying thought here is
that reverse activation of visual cortices in the service of visual
imagery is likely to place stronger demands on reverse con-
nections between frontoparietal executive regions and visual
cortices than does visual perception (Dijkstra et al. 2019). This
idea is strengthened by the observation that many people with
aphantasia experience visual dreams (Dawes et al. 2020; Zeman
et al. 2020), suggesting that they are capable of experiencing
imagery when the requirement for voluntary imagery genera-
tion is removed. Our finding of reduced resting state connec-
tivity between several areas of prefrontal cortex and the visual–
occipital network among people with aphantasia, compared with
those with hyperphantasia, and to control participants, supports
an explanation along these lines. Comparable differences in
connectivity have been reported in relation to autobiographi-
cal memory: Stronger resting state connectivity between the
medial temporal lobes and visual cortices was seen in individuals
reporting a more “episodic” style of autobiographical recollec-
tion, involving greater event detail, while individuals with a
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between the medial temporal lobes and inferior and middle
prefrontal regions (Sheldon et al. 2016). In a related finding,
among patients with Parkinson’s disease, there is a stronger
association between mind-wandering frequency and coupling
between the default mode network and visual areas among
patients with hallucinations as a manifestation of their disorder
than among those who do not hallucinate (Walpola et al. 2020).
Our observation of stronger resting state coupling between both
lateral and medial prefrontal regions and visual cortices among
participants with hyperphantasia than among participants with
aphantasia is potentially relevant both to the difference in their
subjective experience of imagery and to the differences in perfor-
mance we report on measures of autobiographical memory and
imagination.
Using our functional imaging paradigm, we did not find any
difference between aphantasic and hyperphantasic groups in
the most straightforward comparison of visualization versus
control conditions in these two groups, in conflict with our initial
hypothesis. However, we observed an activation difference in
the anterior parietal cortex between hyperphantasic and con-
trol participants on the one hand and aphantasic participants
on the other, in a comparison of visualization and perception.
The anterior parietal area concerned, which was bilateral in
the hyperphantasic/aphantasic comparison but larger in the left
than right hemisphere, is close, but slightly anterior, to the area
of maximum activation by visual imagery tasks in a recent meta-
analysis (Winlove et al. 2018). We hypothesize that this activa-
tion difference reflects weaker deployment of visual attention
within the parietal lobe during attempted visual imagery in
our aphantasic participants than in hyperphantasic and control
participants.
A number of aphantasic participants in our questionnaire
study (Zeman et al. 2020) had mentioned spontaneously that they
were on the autistic spectrum. Given that deficits in imagination,
broadly construed, have been among the defining features of
autistic spectrum disorder, this association appeared plausible.
It is consistent with the observation from our questionnaire
study of an association between aphantasia and mathematical
and scientific occupations (Zeman et al. 2020), as these are
associated, at a group level, with autistic traits (Baron-Cohen
et al. 2001). The current study provides tentative support for a
link between aphantasia and autistic spectrum features, with
elevated Autism Spectrum Quotient questionnaire scores among
aphantasic participants in comparison to the control group. This
observation may relate to the rsfMRI findings discussed above,
as autism has been associated with reduced long-range brain
connectivity (Lai et al. 2014).
The association revealed by the NEO-FFI of aphantasia with
reduced extraversion is in keeping with its association with
elevated AQ scores, as introversion is itself associated with ele-
vated AQ scores (Wakabayashi et al. 2006). In contrast, we found
that hyperphantasia was associated with increased levels of
openness. This construct is more fully described as reflecting
“an openness to new experiences, broad interests, and an active
imagination, and a likelihood of experiencing both positive and
negative emotions more keenly than most people.” It is an intu-
itively plausible personality correlate for high levels of imagery
vividness and has been linked to efficient information processing
with the default mode network (Beaty et al. 2016) and, tentatively,
to variation in the dopamine D4 receptor gene (DRD4) and the
catechol-O-methyltransferase gene (COMT) (Deyoung et al. 2011).
We included three “standard” imagery tests as they have
often been used as measures of imagery, despite doubts that
they would be revealing in this context. The first two tests, the
Manikins test and curved segments test, showed ceiling effects in
our study, with scores over 90% correct in all three groups on the
former and over 98% correct on the latter. They have other short-
comings in the context of visual imagery vividness extremes, as
they primarily assess “spatial imagery,” which may be preserved
in aphantasia (Keogh and Pearson 2018; Bainbridge et al. 2020;
Dawes et al. 2020), rather than “object imagery,” which is likely to
be the main locus of impairment. The animal tails test is, in con-
trast, directed to object imagery (Farah et al. 1988), but our pre-
viously described patient MX, with acquired aphantasia, scored
normally on this test on the basis of “knowledge” rather than
visualization (Zeman et al. 2010). The reduction of scores in the
aphantasic group in the current study suggests that conscious
visual imagery supports performance to some degree, although
their 82% correct average score indicates, in keeping with the
result in MX’s case, that other sources of knowledge make a
contribution. More generally, these findings show that results
of “imagery tests” must be interpreted cautiously, in the light of
participants’ reports of their experience, as they are by no means
pure “measures of visual imagery”: Other sources of knowledge,
both general semantic knowledge and extravisual but modality-
specific information, for example, kinesthetic imagery, can influ-
ence performance. Moreover, visual imagery, itself, is hetero-
geneous, incorporating “object” and “spatial” imagery, which
appear likely to have distinct behavioral associations and neural
bases (Blazhenkova and Kozhevnikov 2010; Kozhevnikov and
Blazhenkova 2013).
Our study has a number of limitations. First, given the com-
plexity of the neural network subserving visualization, and vari-
ability in the associated features of aphantasia (Zeman et al.
2020), it is likely that aphantasia is heterogeneous, with several
subtypes: For example, we suspect that aphantasia in association
with prosopagnosia will turn out to be distinct from aphan-
tasia occurring in its absence. Hyperphantasia, also, is likely
to be heterogeneous. In this study, we have not attempted to
tease apart possible subtypes. We were concerned that resulting
“noise” might obscure any neuropsychological and neural asso-
ciations of extreme imagery. Our findings suggest, however, that
there are at least some consistent differences between people
at the two imagery vividness extremes. Second, anecdotal, and
some experimental, evidence (Morina et al. 2013) indicate that
imagery extremes are likely to have affective associations. We
have not explored these in this study: This topic will be a fruitful
area for further research (Holmes and Mathews 2010; Palombo
and Levine 2018; Dawes et al. 2020). Third, while we found the
classical “imagery tests” relatively insensitive to visual imagery
vividness extremes, as discussed above, the measurement of
response times, which we did not attempt, might have been more
informative. Fourth, the IQ discrepancy between our aphantasic
and hyperphantasic groups introduces a complexity into the
interpretation of our results. However, as the discrepancy favored
the aphantasic group, in which we found that autobiographical
memory and imagination scores were reduced, if anything, dif-
ferences between the groups in these respects are likely to have
been underestimated. Fifth, we did not monitor eye movements
during MRI scanning. This has not been undertaken, as a rule, in
functional imaging studies of visual imagery, but future studies
should ideally include this control, in case systematic group
differences in eye movements may be influencing brain imaging
findings. Sixth, in future studies, it would be desirable to include
a control condition, such as picture description, to probe the pos-
sibility that the reduced scores on measure of autobiographical
memory and imagination in the aphantasic group are related
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use of a relatively low-powered scanner (1.5 T) and whole brain
analyses makes it likely that we have detected only a minority
of the structural and functional differences between the brains
of people lying at the two visual imagery vividness extremes.
Specifically, the current study has not applied a region of interest
analysis to address the question of whether there are differences
in the area of early visual cortices between participants at the two
extremes of the vividness spectrum, as predicted by the findings
of Bergmann et al. (2016). We plan to address this question in
future work.
In conclusion, aphantasia and hyperphantasia are recently
described extremes of visual imagery vividness, occurring in
around 1% and 3% of the population, respectively. Spontaneous
self-report and questionnaire data from several thousand
participants have suggested that these imagery vividness
extremes have a range of psychological and occupational
associations (Dawes et al. 2020; Zeman et al. 2020). Here, we have
shown that aphantasia is not associated with a reduction in
performance on standard declarative memory tests. However,
in keeping with self-report data (Zeman et al. 2020), it is
associated with a marked reduction in performance on exacting
measures of autobiographical memory and temporal and
atemporal “imagination.” Also, in keeping with the self-report
data, there are tentative associations between aphantasia and
both face recognition difficulty and autistic spectrum traits.
Hyperphantasia is associated with the personality trait of
openness, while aphantasia is associated with a reduction in
extraversion. rsfMRI reveals stronger functional connectivity
between prefrontal regions and the visual–occipital network
among hyperphantasic than aphantasic participants. Task-
based fMRI identifies an anterior parietal region distinguishing
the aphantasic sample from the control and hyperphantasic
groups. Further work is required to explore the cognitive and
behavioral advantages and disadvantages of what we suspect
to be two key, contrasting, modes of human information
processing, highlighted by the comparison of hyperphantasia
with aphantasia: One more episodic and sensorily-rich, the other
more semantic and factual. We anticipate that imagery extremes
will have affective associations, which we have not studied here.
A broader range of approaches to behavioral assessment and the
use of more powerful imaging modalities have the potential to
shed further light on this fundamental contrast.
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